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“Standing” in the Shadow of Erie:
Federalism in the Balance in
Hollingsworth v. Perry
Glenn S. Koppel*
I.

Introduction

Consider the following Erie issue: For the purpose of
deciding whether the official proponents of a California
initiative have Article III standing to appeal a lower court
judgment declaring the initiative unconstitutional—admittedly
a question of federal law under Article III’s “case-orcontroversy” provision—should a federal appeals court apply
California state law, as interpreted by that state’s Supreme
Court, authorizing the proponents to assert the state’s
particularized interest in defending the validity of the
challenged initiative, or should the federal court apply federal
standing law requiring a text-based, formal agency
relationship between the State of California, as principal, and
the initiative proponents, as its agent? In other words, is the
scope of Article III broad enough to encompass, and therefore
govern, the question of the initiative proponents’ authority to
assert the State’s interest in federal court and, thereby,
preempt state law on this question?1
This Erie issue2 confronted the U.S. Supreme Court in
* Professor of Law, Western State College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School; A.B., City College of New York. I am grateful to Dean Allen Easley
and Professor Thomas D. Rowe for their invaluable comments on earlier
drafts.
1. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1011 (Cal. 2011) (framing the
issue in the following terms: “the role that state law plays in determining
whether, under federal law, an individual or entity possesses standing to
participate as a party in a federal proceeding.”).
2. While the Erie doctrine typically applies to issues arising in diversity
suits, it is also applicable to “questions of state law arising in a nondiversity
case,” like Hollingsworth. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 563 (6th ed. 2009) (“But what
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Hollingsworth v. Perry,3 one of the two same-sex marriage
cases decided by the Supreme Court in June 2013. In
Hollingsworth, the Court avoided ruling on the merits of the
constitutionality of Proposition 8 because a five-Justice
majority found that the initiative’s proponents lacked standing
to appeal the judgment of the district court that invalidated the
proposition.4 And yet, neither the Court’s Opinion nor the
dissent refers to Erie doctrine in analyzing this essentially
vertical choice-of-law question.
This Article provides an insight into the Court’s
divergent views on the federal standing issue in Hollingsworth
by viewing the Justices’ conflicting positions through the lens
of the Court’s Erie jurisprudence, which, at its core, focuses on
calibrating the proper judicial balance of power in a given case
between conflicting federal and state interests in determining
vertical choice-of-law issues. Hollingsworth is uniquely
positioned at the intersection of federal standing principles and
Erie doctrine, confronting the Court with competing balance of
power concerns inherent in our federal system. Standing, as a
requirement for the limited exercise of federal judicial power
under Article III, addresses the horizontal balance of power
among the three branches of the federal government. Erie
addresses the vertical balance of power between federal and
state courts. Standing is a malleable doctrine that federal
courts have employed to avoid ruling —prematurely in the case
of same-sex marriage—on the merits of a controversial issue.
This Article employs Erie doctrine to critically assess whether a
closely divided Supreme Court in Hollingsworth correctly
privileged the horizontal balance of power concerns at the
expense of the vertical ones.
Achieving a proper balance between federal and state
of questions of state law arising in a nondiversity case? See Maternally Yours
v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956), where the
court said, with respect to a supplemental state law claim in a federal
question case: ‘[I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on
which federal jurisdiction is founded, that determines the governing law. * * *
Thus, the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction,
to any issue or claim which has its source in state law.’ That understanding
has gained general acceptance.”).
3. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
4. See id. at 2662-63.
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interests in resolving difficult Erie issues periodically confronts
the Court whenever a case presents a potential conflict
between federal and state law.5 An essentially functionalist
enterprise, this interest balancing process was first explicitly
articulated by the Court in its 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,6 which replaced the
“mechanistic”7 test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York8 that
privileged outcome-determinative state law, including
technically “procedural” law over federal law including—it was
feared by some commentators at the time9—federal procedural
rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.10 Even after
the Court, in Hanna v. Plumer, held that a Federal Rule,
validly promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act and broad
enough to cover the issue in dispute, prevails over conflicting
state law regardless of outcome difference,11 Byrd’s interest
balancing approach to vertical choice-of-law issues continues to
influence, explicitly or implicitly, the Court’s Erie decisionmaking, most recently in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc., 12 in 1996, and Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
5. See infra Part III.
6. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
7. See Paul J. Katz, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal
Standing Doctrine, and Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1326
(2005) (discussing the recanting of the mechanistic test).
8. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
9. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4508 (2d ed. 1996) (“In the wake
of [the] three 1949 decisions [that followed York] many observers believed
that there was no longer much, if any, room for independent federal
regulation of procedure.”).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
11. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
12. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). But see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for
Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a
Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev.
963, 1007-1008 (Yet much as I may disagree with Professor Floyd when he
asserts that “[t]he Gasperini majority relied centrally on Byrd” (cite
omitted)—for the Court does not engage in Byrd-style balancing to decide on
the allocation of trial- and appellate-level responsibilities, and Byrd plays no
role in the choice of standard for verdict-excessiveness review—the opinion
largely earns his criticism that “Byrd still lives, but we know not why, or to
what extent.” (cite omitted). About all we get from the Gasperini opinion is
the apparent direction not to rely solely on “outcome determination” analysis
in decisional-federal-law “cases presenting countervailing federal interests,”
518 U.S. at 432.)
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Allstate Insurance Co.13 in 2010.
Wright, Miller & Cooper commented, before the
Hollingsworth decision, that “[l]ittle attention has been paid to
the question whether state law may have some independent
influence on standing.”14 I have been able to locate only one
article that explores in depth the relationship between
standing and Erie15 but did so as a reverse-Erie question—
whether state courts are constitutionally required under the
Supremacy Clause to apply federal standing requirements
when adjudicating federal claims. When does Congress’
“substantive interest in uniform enforcement of its policies [in
state courts] outweigh[] a state’s interest in maintaining its
own justiciability limits[?]”16 It is settled law that state courts
are not bound by Article III’s case or controversy
requirement.17 The author, however, applies the Byrd13. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
14. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.14 (3d ed. 2008).
15. For another reference to federal standing and Erie, see William A.
Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication
of Federal Questions, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 295, note 143 (1990) (“Further,
under my theory of standing as a matter of substantive law . . . state
standing law should be binding on the federal courts, just as other
substantive state law currently binds the federal courts under the Erie
doctrine. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus, a state court
determination of standing to enforce state substantive law should be binding
on the federal courts.”).
16. Katz, supra note 7, at 1331 (arguing that state standing rules “affect
the behavior of potential litigants and the courts” and, therefore, have a
substantive impact of the uniform enforcement of federally created rights).
17. See, e.g., Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1257, 1260, 1272 (2011) (“This is so because the Supreme Court's recent
justiciability case law ties its hands in such cases. The Court has held that
federal justiciability requirements are constitutionally mandated constraints
on federal jurisdiction, applicable not only to the original jurisdiction of lower
federal courts, but also to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. In
contrast, most state courts treat the doctrines of standing, mootness, and
ripeness as discretionary, holding that they possess broad discretion to hear
cases that are moot or unripe, or in which the plaintiff lacks standing. State
justiciability law is a question of state court jurisdiction, which is a matter
generally committed to the authority of state government, rather than one
imposed by the federal Constitution. From these principles, the Court has
deduced that it lacks jurisdiction over state court determinations of federal
law rendered in cases that would not satisfy federal justiciability standards . .
. . The Supreme Court, too, has repeatedly acknowledged the principle that,
as a matter of sovereignty, state courts are free to apply their own

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4

4

2014]

“STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE

635

balancing approach to weigh the interest of state courts in
applying their own—”procedural”—standing rules against the
“substantive” interest of Congress in the uniform enforcement
of federal rights in all state courts across the nation, and
concludes that the federal interest in the application by state
courts of uniform federal standing principles should prevail.18
This Article proposes that the Court’s majority and dissenting
opinions in Hollingsworth can be similarly understood in terms
of Byrd-style balancing of competing federal and state
interests.
Also at play in Erie jurisprudence in resolving potential
conflicts between federal and state laws is the unresolved
tension between formalism and functionalism in the
interpretation of legal text, a thread that weaves its way
through the Court’s Erie case law.19 The pendulum of the
Court’s Erie jurisprudence has swung over the years between a
formalist approach that favors a principled, bright-line rule
aimed at achieving the benefits of uniformity and
predictability, and a functionalist approach that favors “getting
it right” on a case-by-case basis by inquiring into the purpose
behind the state rule to discern whether there are substantive
interests at stake that should be respected in federal court
decision-making. This formalist-functionalist tension is also
manifested in the majority and dissenting opinions in

conceptions of justiciability and are not bound by Article III's limitations on
federal court jurisdiction.”).
18. Also see Fletcher, supra note 15 at 282, note 92: “My thesis may be
quickly stated: Standing determinations are decisions on the merits rather
than jurisdictional decisions. Whether a plaintiff has standing depends on the
particular statutory or constitutional provisions under which she brings suit.
Article III imposes no standing-based "case or controversy" limitations except
in feigned cases when a plaintiff lies about an injury she claims to suffer, and
in cases where Congress grants standing as a mechanism to solicit a judicial
opinion to which Congress desires an answer. If standing decisions are
understood, as I think they should be, as decisions on the merits, it
necessarily follows that state courts should be required under the supremacy
clause to abide by federal standing doctrine. Although I believe this approach
is correct, I have refrained from relying on it in this Article.”
19. See generally Glenn S. Koppel, The Fruits of Shady Grove: Seeing the
Forest for the Trees, 44 AKRON L. REV. 999 (2011) [hereinafter The Fruits of
Shady Grove]; Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of
Formalism in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 905 (2012).
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Hollingsworth.
In Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit panel adopted a
functionalist approach to federal court standing by narrowly
construing the scope of Article III standing law to create room
for the application of state law—in deference to California’s
state interests—to determine a question it termed “antecedent
to determining federal standing[:] . . . who is authorized to
assert the People’s interest in the constitutionality of an
initiative measure?”20 When the Ninth Circuit certified this
question to the California Supreme Court, it seemed to this
puzzled author to be an unassailable principle that the federal
judiciary has an overriding interest, as an independent judicial
system, in determining that question as a matter of federal
standing law rooted in Article III’s case-or-controversy
provision, without regard to conflicting state law. Upon further
reflection, based upon a careful reading of the opinions of the
California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit panel in Perry
v. Brown, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Hollingsworth, I
realized that important sovereign state interests in selfgovernment warranted a narrow construction of Article III
standing doctrine. The California Supreme Court responded, in
functional terms, that “[t]he initiative power would be
significantly impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s
interest in the validity of the measure when elected officials
decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment
invalidating the measure[,]”21 and held:
[W]hen the public officials who ordinarily defend
a challenged state law or appeal a judgment
invalidating the law decline to do so, under
article II, section 8 of the California Constitution
and the relevant provisions of the Elections
Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved
initiative measure are authorized to assert the
state’s interest in the initiative’s validity,
enabling the proponents to defend the
constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a
20. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added).
21. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (Cal. 2011).
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judgment invalidating the initiative.22
The Ninth Circuit panel adopted the Supreme Court of
California’s holding in Perry v. Brown as the basis for the
panel’s holding that the official proponents of Proposition 8 had
federal appellate standing to assert the interests of the State of
California.23 Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in
Hollingsworth agreed with the panel’s functionalist analysis
that “[p]roper resolution of the justiciability question requires,
in this case, a threshold determination of state law”24 and that
state law governs the authority of initiative proponents to
assert, in federal court, the State’s interest in “the integrity of
its initiative process.”25
The Supreme Court’s five-Justice majority rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s functionalist ruling in favor of what appears, at
least on the surface, to be a rigidly formalist approach that
broadly construes the reach of Article III standing doctrine to
control the authority of initiative proponents under state law to
represent the State’s interest in federal court. The Court’s
majority and dissenting opinions in Hollingsworth appear to
align along formalist versus functionalist lines, suggestive of
the Court’s past Erie decisions. These decisions have oscillated
between formalist bright-line tests and flexible functional tests
that create room for consideration of any competing
substantive state interests at stake. Most recently the Court
used a bright-line test in Shady Grove,26 where another fiveJustice majority ruled that the literal text of the federal class
action rule preempted a “conflicting” state class action rule.
The Court used a flexible functional test in Gasperini, where
the federal rule governing new trial motions was narrowly
construed to avoid a conflict with state substantive interests in
controlling runaway jury verdicts that underlay New York’s
procedural statute giving state courts increased scrutiny over

22. Id. at 1033.
23. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1075.
24. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.
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jury awards.27
The Court in Hollingsworth ruled that—to confer federal
standing on initiative proponents—federal standing principles
require that state law explicitly—by legal text—appoint
initiative sponsors “as agents of the people . . . to defend . . . the
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”28 The
Court’s majority found lacking “the most basic features of an
agency relationship” consistent with the Restatement of
Agency.29 In the absence of a fiduciary relationship between
initiative proponents and the State, the former would merely
be asserting their own generalized interest instead of the
State’s particularized interest: “And no matter its reasons, the
fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to
seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our
settled law to the contrary.”30 As noted by one commentator,
“[t]he California Supreme Court’s holding that California law
allows for proponents of initiatives to represent the State’s
interest was not grounded in the text of a statute or any
provision of the California State Constitution.”31 This Article
proposes that the Court’s requirement of a “textual basis . . . for
delegation of [a] State’s Article III standing[,]”32 consistent with
the Restatement, is formalist in its inflexibility which is not
warranted given the malleable nature of federal standing law.
However, a deeper analysis of the Hollingsworth opinions
from an Erie perspective reveals, instead, a stark contrast
27. See generally Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415
(1996).
28. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666 (citing Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997)) (“we [we]re aware of no Arizona
law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law
of the State”).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2667 (emphasis added).
31. Corrine Blalock, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Expressive Harm and the
Stakes of “Marriage”, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 217, 234
(2013); see also Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s
Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (VII), SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 21, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understandingstanding-the-courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-vii/
(referring to the California’s Supreme Court’s functionalist reasoning as
“untethered to text and precedent”).
32. Blalock, supra note 31, at 234.
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between two conflicting functionalist views in terms of
balancing the federal and state interests at stake and the
potential harms to each interest that would result from
application of federal or state law to the question of the
proponent’s authority to assert the state’s interest in defending
Proposition 8 in federal court. The majority’s requirement of a
formal agency relationship is grounded in its functionalist
concern with “preserv[ing] the federal courts’ Article III role”33
and conflicts with the dissent’s functionalist concern with
preserving the integrity of the State’s initiative process.
Part II provides a brief background of the Hollingsworth
opinions. Part III briefly narrates the evolution of Erie
jurisprudence from a mechanistically-applied outcome
determinative test that favored state substantive interests over
federal interests in the uniform application of the federal rules,
to a flexible, functional approach, in Byrd,34 that restored some
equilibrium to the federal/state judicial balance by
counterbalancing “outcome determination” with the interests of
the federal courts as an independent judicial system. This
Byrd-based balancing equation implicitly—if not explicitly—
has informed the Court’s subsequent Erie decisions from
Hanna through Gasperini, to Shady Grove.35
Part IV critically evaluates each side’s warnings in
Hollingsworth that a Pandora’s box would be opened—
undermining the foundations of either Article III standing or
California’s initiative process—if federal standing law or
California state law were applied, and demonstrates that the
majority and dissenting opinions reflect this Byrd-based
interest-balancing approach to the vertical choice of law issue
in dispute. Part IV concludes that the majority “got it wrong” in
terms of Erie doctrine by overstating the harm to the federal
interest in keeping the exercise of judicial power within the
confines of Article III at the expense of substantial harm to
California’s interest in the integrity of its initiative process.
33. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents on the Issue of Standing at 28, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 768643, at *28.
34. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
35. See generally Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The
Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2010).
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This Article does not take a position on the merits of the
initiative process. A respectable case can be made that the
legislative dysfunction that gave rise to the initiative power in
the early Twentieth Century has gradually warped that power
in the current century as interest groups—including some
located out-of-state—funnel financial resources to finance
media campaigns in support of controversial initiatives, as
occurred in the run-up to the passage of Proposition 8.36
II. A Synopsis of Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Standing Issue
in Context
Appellate standing was a threshold issue in both
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor, the two
“same-sex” marriage cases before the Court. Applying federal
law requiring petitioners to have suffered “a concrete and
particularized” injury, standing was upheld in Windsor but
denied in Hollingsworth.

36. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in
Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1 (“As proponents of
same-sex marriage across the country planned protests on Saturday
against the ban, interviews with the main forces behind the ballot
measure showed how close its backers believe it came to defeat — and
the extraordinary role Mormons played in helping to pass it with
money, institutional support and dedicated volunteers. ‘We’ve spoken
out on other issues, we’ve spoken out on abortion, we’ve spoken out on
those other kinds of things,’ said Michael R. Otterson, the managing
director of public affairs for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, as the Mormons are formally called, in Salt Lake City. ‘But we
don’t get involved to the degree we did on this.” . . . In the end,
Protect Marriage estimates, as much as half of the nearly $40 million
raised on behalf of the measure was contributed by Mormons.”); see
also Proposition 8—Tracking the money: Final Numbers, L.A. TIMES
(Feb
3,
2009,
6:21PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lamoneymap,0,1777132.htmlstory#axzz2xBWVIM6v
(Approximately
30% of the money raised in support of Prop 8 ($13,254,350 out of at
total $44,103,525) and 28% of the money raised in opposition to Prop
8 ($11,224,394 out of a total $38,766,260) came from outside
California.); see generally Allen K. Easley, Buying Back the First
Amendment: Regulation of Disproportionate Corporate Spending in
Ballot Issue Campaigns, 17 GA. L. REV. 675 (1983).
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A. United States v. Windsor
Edith Windsor, who married her same sex partner in a
lawful ceremony in Canada, sought to claim the estate tax
exemption granted by U.S. tax law for surviving spouses.
Windsor, however, was barred from doing so by § 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which excludes a same-sex
partner from the definition of “spouse.”37 In her federal district
court suit seeking a tax refund denied her by the IRS, Windsor
claimed that § 3 was unconstitutional. Although the
government continued to enforce § 3 by not paying Windsor the
refund, the Justice Department, on the President’s instruction,
did not defend it. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)
of the House of Representatives intervened to defend § 3’s
constitutionality. The federal district court invalidated § 3 as
unconstitutional and ordered the Government to pay Windsor a
refund which, continuing to enforce DOMA, it refused to do.
The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the district court’s judgment, and the case
subsequently went to the Supreme Court. BLAG appeared as
amicus curiae. The Government appealed, but declined to
defend the lower court decisions on the merits, in order to
obtain a Supreme Court ruling invalidating § 3 of DOMA.38
The Court did not have to decide whether BLAG had
Article III standing because, according to Justice Kennedy’s
Opinion of the Court, the Government, as petitioner, continued
to suffer a real and immediate economic “injury to the national
Treasury if payment is made,” payment of “money that [the
U.S.] would not disburse but for the court’s order.”39 This
despite the fact that the Government agreed with Ms. Windsor
that the provision of DOMA that denied her the same benefits
as a heterosexual married couple received under the federal tax
laws was unconstitutional and welcomed the district court’s
order to refund the money. The Court held: [E]ven where “the
37. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
38. Id. at 2686 (“That the Executive may welcome this order to

pay the refund if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it
wants does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if
payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it is not.”).
39. Id. .
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Government largely agree[s] with the opposing party on the
merits of the controversy, there is sufficient adverseness and
an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the
Government intended to enforce the challenged law against
that party.”40
A weakness in the majority’s finding of “sufficient
adverseness,” based on the Government’s intent to enforce § 3,
is the Government’s agreement with the plaintiff’s position
that § 3 is unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy acknowledged
that the “Executive’s agreement with Windsor’s legal argument
raises the risk that instead of a ‘real, earnest and vital
controversy’ the Court faces a ‘friendly, non-adversary,
proceeding . . . [in which] ‘a party beaten in the legislature
[seeks to] transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.’”41 Noting that “this case
is not routine,”42 he minimized the problem in two ways. First,
by characterizing adverseness as a “prudential problem[],”
Justice Kennedy downgraded adverseness from a required
element of standing to a flexible “prudential consideration”43
subject to the Court’s discretion. Second, he relied on BLAG, a
non-party participating solely in an amicus curiae capacity, to
shore up Government’s ineffectual defense, noting that
“BLAG’s sharp adversarial presentation of the issues satisfies
the prudential concerns that otherwise might counsel against
hearing an appeal from a decision with which the principal
parties agree.”44
40. Id. at 2686-87 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
41. Id. at 2687 (alteration in original); see also id. at 2689 (“The
Court’s jurisdictional holding, it must be underscored, does not mean
the arguments for dismissing this dispute on prudential grounds lack
substance.”).
42. Id. at 2689 (“[T]he merits question . . . is one of immediate
importance to the Federal Government and to hundreds of thousands
of persons. These circumstances support the Court’s decision to
proceed to the merits.”).
43. Id. at 2687 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 2688-89 (emphasizing that “[t]he Court’s jurisdictional
holding . . . does not mean the arguments for dismissing the dispute
on prudential grounds lack substance” cautioning that “there is no
suggestion here that it is appropriate for the Executive as a matter of
course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather than making
the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal”).
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Justice Scalia challenged the Court’s reliance on amici
curiae to provide a vigorous defense of the challenged statute,
contending that
[T]he existence of a controversy is not a
‘prudential’ requirement that we have invented,
but an essential element of an Article III case or
controversy. The majority’s notion that a case
between friendly parties can be entertained so
long as ‘adversarial presentation of the issues is
assured by the participation of amici curiae
prepared to defend with vigor’ the other side of
the issue . . . effects a breathtaking revolution in
our Article III jurisprudence.45
In contrast to the Windsor majority’s reliance on BLAG’s
ability to sharpen the issues for the Court, the majority in
Hollingsworth cast doubt on the value of the Proposition 8
proponents’ adversarial presentation, noting that they “answer
to no one . . . decide for themselves, with no review, what
arguments to make and how to make them[,]”46 and “are free to
pursue a purely ideological commitment to the law’s
constitutionality . . . .”47
B. Hollingsworth v. Perry
Unlike Windsor where the Court did not have to decide
whether BLAG had appellate standing because the Justice
Department had petitioned on behalf of the United States, in
Hollingsworth the state officials who were the named
defendants in the district court suit declined to appeal the
judgment invalidating Proposition 8, leaving the official
initiative proponents as the only petitioners before the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the standing
issue before the Ninth Circuit, in Perry v. Brown, and the
Supreme Court, in Hollingsworth, focused exclusively on
45. Id. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
46. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013).
47. Id. at 2667.
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whether the initiative proponents had appellate standing to
assert either their own interest or the state’s interest. As noted
by Professor Lederman,
the Court [had] little choice but to decide
whether the Proposition 8 proponents have
Article III standing to appeal in Hollingsworth v.
Perry. The proponents are, after all, the only
petitioners in that case, and in order to ensure
the case remains fit for federal-court
adjudication, ‘the parties must have the
necessary stake not only at the outset of
litigation, but throughout its course,’ including
on appeal.48
In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that limiting
marriage to heterosexual couples violated the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution.49 In reaction to that
decision, California voters passed Proposition 8, which
amended the California Constitution to provide that “[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.”50 The plaintiffs in Hollingsworth, two same sex
couples who wanted to be married, filed suit in federal court
challenging Proposition 8 under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and naming
as defendants the several state officials responsible for
enforcing the state’s marriage laws. Although these state
officials filed answers to the complaint, they refused to argue in
favor of Proposition 8’s constitutionality.51 The district court
allowed the official initiative proponents to intervene to defend
Proposition 8. After a 12-day trial, the District Court declared
Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement by
48. Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s
Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (V),
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
20,
2013,
7:46
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-thecourts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-v/
(citations omitted).
49. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
50. Id. (alteration in original).
51. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4

14

2014]

“STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE

645

“defendants and all persons under their control or supervision .
. . .”52 Only the official proponents appealed the injunction to
the Ninth Circuit; the government defendants did not.
Concluding that the “Proponents’ standing to appeal
depended on the precise rights and interests given to official
sponsors of an initiative under California law, which ha[ve]
never been clearly defined by the State’s highest court[,]” the
Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California
Supreme Court:
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the
California Constitution, or otherwise under
California law, the official proponents of an
initiative measure possess either a particularized
interest in the initiative’s validity or the
authority to assert the State’s interest in the
initiative’s validity, which would enable them to
defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon
its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating
the initiative, when the public officials charged
with that duty refuse to do so.53
The California Supreme Court did not address whether
official initiative proponents have a particularized interest in
the initiative’s validity, focusing, instead, on whether
proponents had the authority to assert the State’s interest.
Unable to identify a “specific source of authority”54 grounded in
the text of a statute or provision of the California Constitution
or the initiative itself, the Court engaged in a functional
interpretation of the state constitutional provision setting forth
the People’s initiative power as well as the provisions of the
Election Code relating to the proponent’s role in the initiative
process. The Court concluded that the State’s interest in the
integrity of the initiative power “would be significantly
impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s interest in
the validity of the measure when elected officials decline to
52. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
53. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1070 (emphasis added).
54. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (Cal. 2011).
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defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the
measure.”55 The Court held:
[W]hen the public officials who ordinarily defend
a challenged measure decline to do so, article II,
section 8 of the California Constitution and the
applicable provisions of the Elections Code
authorize the official proponents of an initiative
measure to intervene or to participate as real
parties in interest in a judicial proceeding to
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s
validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating
the measure.56
Also functionalist in nature—and especially significant in
light of the closeness of the five-to-four split in the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hollingsworth over the proper balance
between federal and state interests—is the California Supreme
Court’s reference to the primary purpose57 underlying the
state’s initiative power “to afford the people the ability to
propose and to adopt constitutional amendments or statutory
provisions that their elected officials had refused or declined to
adopt.”58 In the opinion of California’s high court, this purpose
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1025.
57. For an explanation of the nature of functionalism or

instrumentalism, see BAILEY KULKIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 145 (1994) (“Instrumentalist adjudication
does not disregard the governing rule but application of the rule may
be modified if strict application would undermine or fail to further the
function intended to be achieved by the rule or the legal system of
which it is a part.”).
58. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1016 (emphasis added); see also Marty
Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III Questions
in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (VI), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2013,
6:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-thecourts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-vi/ (“[T]he state
supreme court’s principal justification [for interpreting California law
to authorize initiative proponents to represent the state’s interest in
defending an initiative’s validity was] . . . frankly a functionalist
one—namely, preservation of the efficacy of the California initiative
process[.]”) [hereinafter Understanding Standing (VI)].
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would be undermined if initiative proponents were unable to
defend the measure, once adopted, when state officials refuse to
do so.59 Also noteworthy, in light of the doubts expressed by the
majority opinion in Hollingsworth about the qualifications of
the proposition’s official proponents to represent the State’s
interest60 on appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded
that “the official proponents . . . have a unique relationship to
the voter-approved measure that makes them especially likely
to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the measure and to be
so viewed by those whose votes secured the initiative’s
enactment into law.”61
At this point, the Ninth Circuit panel confronted a classic
Erie choice-of-law issue. For the purpose of determining federal
appellate standing, should the federal court apply California
law that “confers on the official proponents of an initiative the
authority to assert the State’s interests in defending the
constitutionality of that initiative, where the state officials who
would ordinarily assume that responsibility choose not to do
so?”62 Or is the proponents’ authority to represent the State’s
interest on appeal in federal court governed by federal standing
principles under Article III?
The panel narrowly interpreted the reach of Article III
standing jurisprudence to conclude that, as a matter of vertical
federalism, federal law does not control this issue. A conflict
between Article III jurisprudence and state law, as interpreted
by the California Supreme Court in Perry v. Brown, was

59. See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1022 (noting that the “enhanced risk
[that public officials may not defend the approved initiative measure
with vigor] is attributable to the unique nature and purpose of the
initiative power, which gives the people the right to adopt into law
measures that their elected officials have not adopted and may often
oppose”).
60. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666, 2667, 2671
(2013) (In contrast to the Windsor majority’s reliance on BLAG’s
ability to sharpen the merits issues for the Court, the majority in
Hollingsworth, seemed to cast doubt on the value of the Prop 8
proponents’ adversarial presentation, noting that they “answer to no
one,” “decide for themselves with no review, what arguments to make
and how to make them,” and “are free to pursue a purely ideological
commitment to the law’s constitutionality . . . .”).
61. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1024 (emphasis added).
62. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012).
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thereby avoided. While acknowledging that state law does not
have the “power directly to enlarge or contract federal
jurisdiction” since “[s]tanding to sue in any Article III court is,
of course, a federal question which does not depend on the
party’s . . . standing in state court,” the panel ruled that
“[s]tate law does have the power, however, to answer questions
antecedent to determining federal standing, such as the one
here: who is authorized to assert the People’s interest in the
constitutionality of an initiative measure[.]”63
The panel engaged in an Erie-style analysis of the balance
of power in vertical federalism, coming down heavily in favor of
respecting
[the states’] prerogative, as independent
sovereigns, to decide for themselves who may
assert their interests and under what
circumstances, and to bestow that authority
accordingly. . . . Principles of federalism require
that federal courts respect such decisions by the
states as to who may speak for them: “there are
limits on the Federal Government’s power to
affect the internal operations of a State.”64
The panel stressed California’s unique commitment to the
People’s initiative power and the key role the ballot initiative
plays in California’s governmental structure, and agreed with
the contention of the State’s highest court that “[t]he initiative
power would be significantly impaired if there were no one to
assert the state’s interest” in defending the measure on appeal
when state officials refused to do so.65 The panel’s opinion did
not address “whether, under California law, the official
proponents also possess a particularized interest in a voterapproved initiative’s validity[,]”66 holding only that:
Because the State of California has Article III
63. Id. at 1074-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1071 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 1073 (alteration in original) (quoting Perry, 265 P.3d at

1024).

66. Id. at 1074 (citing Perry, 265 P.3d at 1015).
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standing to defend the constitutionality of
Proposition 8, and because both the California
Constitution and California law authorize “the
official proponents of [an] initiative . . . to appear
and assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s
validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating
the measure when the public officials who
ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a
judgment declined to do so,” we conclude that
Proponents are proper appellants here.67
As discussed in Part IV, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Hollingsworth sharply divided over the Ninth Circuit’s vision of
vertical federalism in the context of federal standing and the
appropriate balance to strike between federal and state
interests. The majority affirmed that “standing in federal court
is a question of federal law, not state law[]”68 and that the
states cannot override the “vital [federal] interests going to the
role of the Judiciary in our system of separated powers . . .
simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack
standing a ticket to the federal courthouse.”69 By contrast, the
four-Justice dissent charged that “[t]he Court’s opinion
disrespects and disparages both the political process in
California and the well-stated opinion of the California
Supreme Court in this case.”70
The standing issue in Hollingsworth raised the vertical
choice of law question whether state law can have some
independent influence on federal appellate standing. In a
federal question case concerning the constitutionality of a state
initiative, does California state law govern an “antecedent” or
“threshold” question whether the proponents of a state
initiative are authorized to represent the State’s interest for
the purpose of determining the standing of the proponents to
appeal in federal court? Or, rather, does Article III control this
question, requiring that, in order for the authority conferred on
initiative proponents by state law to assert the state’s interest
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1075 (citation omitted).
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013).
Id.
Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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in defending an initiative to be sufficient to confer federal court
standing on the proponents, that authority must meet the
formal agency requirements of the Restatement (Third) of
Agency?
As noted earlier, Wright, Miller, & Cooper commented,
before the Hollingsworth opinions were published, that “[l]ittle
attention has been paid to the question whether state law may
have some independent influence on standing.”71 In federal
court diversity cases, there is precedent to support the
application of state standing rules that would deny standing
where federal standing doctrine recognizes standing. However,
it is unclear whether, in federal diversity cases, where the
court is adjudicating a state right, standing is never satisfied if
recognized under state law but not under Article III
principles.72 In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the district court
exercised federal question jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’
claim that Proposition 8 violated their federal constitutional
rights. According to Wright, Miller, & Cooper, “[w]hen suit is
brought in a federal court to enforce a claim of federal right,
whether statutory or constitutional, the question of standing
ordinarily is treated as a federal question”73 which is governed
by federal law. As previously mentioned, even the Ninth
Circuit panel conceded in Perry v. Brown, that “‘[s]tanding to
sue in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question
71. 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, at § 3531.14.
72. See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, at §

3531.14 (“Of course state rules that recognize standing need not be
honored if Article III requirements are not met, although Article III
concepts should be sufficiently flexible to recognize state-created
rights to proceed in the public interest. If a clear case should appear
in which standing would be recognized by state rules but denied by
prudential federal rules, the federal court would have to choose
between the general obligation to exercise diversity jurisdiction and
its doubts as to the wisdom of enforcing this state claim of this
particular plaintiff. It does not seem likely that the same choice
should be made for all cases. It might be appropriate to deny standing
on the basis of strong prudential objections, particularly if the
interests pursued by the plaintiff seem remote and the substantive
issues are sensitive. This course would be a de facto form of
abstention. On the other hand, state standing might well be honored
if there is a reasonable ground for seeking decision and the
prudential objections are relatively weak.”).
73. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4

20

2014]

“STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE

651

which does not depend on the party’s . . . standing in state
court.’”74
In Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court’s five-to-four
disagreement over the applicable law—federal or state—to
determine the federal standing issue, based on the proponents’
authority under California law to assert the State’s interest on
appeal, reflects core differences over the weight to be accorded
competing federal and state interests.
The majority placed overriding weight on the federal
interest in confining the Judicial Power within Article III
limits, a concern relating to the foundation of the federal
tripartite governmental structure that dictates the application
of federal standing law to safeguard that structure. Applying
federal standing precedent, the majority ruled that the
Proposition 8 proponents possessed only a “generalized”
interest75 which did not satisfy “Article III’s requirement that a
party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for
a personal, particularized injury [which] serves vital interests
going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of separation of
powers.”76 The Court imposed a formal, text-based “agency”
requirement on the authority of a state to authorize private
parties to represent the state’s interest in federal court. As a
“gloss on Article III,” in Professor Lederman’s words,77 federal
standing law, according the Court’s majority, requires that
state law expressly appoint initiative proponents as the State’s
agents to suffice for federal standing. The Court’s Opinion
noted that the California Supreme Court “never described
petitioners as ‘agents of the people,’ or of anyone else.”78 The
initiative proponents were merely private parties, possessing
only a generalized interest, who were not the State’s agents as
“agency” is narrowly defined by the Restatement of Agency.
Observing that the “basic features of an agency relationship
are missing here,”79 the majority stressed the absence of a
74. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)).
75. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013).
76. Id. at 2667.
77. See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58.
78. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
79. Id.
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fiduciary relationship between the proponents and the State:
“[P]etitioners answer to no one; they decide for themselves,
with no review, what arguments to make and how to make
them.”80 This essentially formalist approach to the choice of law
issue in Hollingsworth was driven by a functionalist “parade of
horribles”81 that would be unleashed if California law were to
override vital federal interests.82 The majority implied that,
had California law appointed the initiative proponents as the
State’s agents, that would satisfy federal standing law, but
“[n]either the California Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit
ever described the proponents as agents of the State, and they
plainly do not qualify as such.”83
By contrast, the dissent placed overriding weight on
California’s interest in organizing its own governmental
structure which dictates the application of California law
giving “a proponent . . . the authority to appear in court and
assert the State’s interest in defending an enacted initiative
when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do
so.”84 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the state’s interest would be
harmed by refusing to apply California law as interpreted by
the state’s Supreme Court: “Giving the Governor and attorney
Id.
See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
Id. at 2667. Both parties argued Karcher and Arizonans to
support their opposing views on the agency issue. See infra Part IV,
for a discussion of these decisions. The Court’s Opinion acknowledged
that the Proponents would have had federal standing if California
state law had appointed them as the agents of the People to assert
their interests in defending the initiative, noting that, in Karcher,
New Jersey law “provide[d] for other officials to speak for the State in
federal court[.]” Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664. Both parties in
Hollingsworth cited the Court’s earlier decision in Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), which denied
appellate standing to the official sponsors of the ballot initiative
based, in part, on the absence of an “Arizona law appointing initiative
sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public
officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.”
Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65. The majority opinion
in Hollingsworth rejected the proponents’ argument that California
law appointed them agents of the People, noting that the California
Supreme Court “never described petitioners as ‘agents of the people,’
or of anyone else.” Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
84. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80.
81.
82.
83.
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general [a] de facto veto will erode one of the cornerstones of
the State’s governmental structure.”85 While acknowledging
that the “proponent’s standing to defend an initiative in federal
court is a question of federal law[,]”86 the dissent agreed with
the Ninth Circuit’s and the California Supreme Court’s
functionalist reasoning that the authority of the proponents to
assert the State’s interest in defending an initiative when the
public officials refused to do so is “a threshold determination of
state law”87 which must be applied by the federal courts to
avoid undermining the “primary purpose” underlying the
People’s initiative power.88 Justice Kennedy’s dissent also
argued that the majority’s invocation of formal agency
principles as a matter of federal standing law is misplaced,
asserting that “the Restatement may offer no workable
example of an agent representing a principal composed of
nearly 40 million residents of a State[]”89 and that it is for the
California Supreme Court, not federal law, to determine
whether the proponents are sufficiently accountable to the
People.90 He concluded that, “[c]ontrary to the Court’s
suggestion, this Court’s precedents do not indicate that a
formal agency relationship is necessary.”91
The opinions’ words, taken at face value, indicate that the
disagreement between the majority and the dissenting justices
concerns the perennial Erie question of the appropriate balance
to strike, in vertical choice of law, between competing federal
and state interests. Chief Justice Roberts, speaking for the
majority, viewed as paramount the “vital [federal] interests
going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of separated
powers.”92 This overriding federal concern with maintaining
Id. at 2671.
Id. at 2668.
Id.
See id. at 2671 (“The California Supreme Court has
determined that this purpose is undermined if the very officials the
initiative process seeks to circumvent are the only parties who can
defend an enacted initiative when it is challenged in a legal
proceeding.”).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2671-72.
91. Id. at 2672.
92. Id. at 2667.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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the balance of power among the three branches of the federal
government was at the core of Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Windsor:
[T]hose who wrote and ratified our national
charter . . . knew well the dangers of “primary”
power, and so created branches of government
that would be “perfectly coordinate by the terms
of their common commission,” none of which
branches could “pretend to an exclusive or
superior right of settling the boundaries between
their respective powers.”93
By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s dissent chided the majority for
“nullifying” the choice of the people of California who, in
adopting the initiative process, “have exercised their own
inherent sovereign right to govern themselves.”94
Although the Hollingsworth opinions do not refer to Erie
by name, the majority’s and dissent’s disagreement on standing
can profitably be understood within the framework—in the
shadow—of Erie. Some commentators have observed that the
Court frequently employs flexible standing principles to avoid
wrestling with difficult constitutional issues. 95 This could have
been the case, beneath the surface, in Hollingsworth, where the
Court’s standing ruling may have camouflaged a behind-the93. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 886-90 (1983).
94. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531
(“However reassuring it may seem to describe the elements of
standing in these brief phrases, the [standing] doctrines have
changed continually. Decisions in recent years seem to have achieved
a stability in expression, but there are almost unlimited opportunities
to disagree in applying the Supreme Court’s broad expressions.
Decades ago, Justice Douglas observed that ‘[g]eneralizations about
standing to sue are largely worthless as such.’ Many exasperated
courts and commentators have echoed the thought, often adding that
standing doctrine is no more than a convenient tool to avoid
uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the
merits.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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scenes agreement among the majority Justices to avoid ruling
on the substantive constitutional issue of the validity of
Proposition 8 with its all-or-nothing implications for the right
of same-sex marriage nationally.96 Parsing the words used in
the two opinions to justify their conflicting conclusions on
standing, this Article purports to analyze the Court’s division
over the standing issue in terms of the proper judicial balance
of power in intra-state federalism that lies at the heart of Erie
jurisprudence. Part III’s theme that Erie jurisprudence is, at its
core, about weighing competing federal and state interests sets
the stage for Part IV’s critical assessment of the Court’s
opinion that, from the perspective of Erie jurisprudence,
sacrifices California’s sovereign interest in self-government to
avoid dealing with the merits of the case by applying a
stringent view of federal standing that trumps California state
law.
III. “Erie” Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Calibrating the
Appropriate Balance of Power in Judicial Federalism
between Federal and State Interests
As Professor Freer observed, “there are competing
interests in every difficult Erie case”97 which the Court has had
to balance, and this is equally true in Hollingsworth. Ever
since the Supreme Court in its Erie opinion interpreted the
Rules of Decision Act to require federal courts to apply state
96. See Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s
Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (I),
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
17,
2013,
11:05
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-thecourts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-i/ (“There
already has been much speculation, and no doubt there will be much
more, about whether some or all of the Justices might be motivated to
find a lack of justiciability in either or both cases in order to avoid a
holding on the merits—and about whether they would be wise or
justified in doing so.”) [hereinafter Understanding Standing (I)].
Justice Kennedy hinted in his dissent that the Court’s Opinion may
have been motivated by a desire to avoid confronting a contentious
issue on the merits: “Of course, the Court must be cautious before
entering a realm of controversy where the legal community and
society at large are still formulating ideas and approaches to a most
difficult subject.” Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2674.
97. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 77.
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substantive law in the absence of controlling federal law and,
subsequently in Hanna v. Plumer, interpreted the Rules
Enabling Act to require the application of valid and controlling
federal rules of procedure, federal statutes and federal
constitutional provisions regardless of outcome difference98, the
Court has struggled, through a series of decisions, to find the
appropriate balance in vertical choice of law between state and
federal interests. As noted by Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty
Trust v. York, Erie “expressed a policy that touches vitally the
proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal
courts[,]”99 an issue that split the Court in Hollingsworth.
The shifting judicial balance of power manifested by the
Court’s Erie jurisprudence reflects, in part, the tension between
formalism and functionalism and the corresponding and
elusive attempts to distinguish between “substance” and
“procedure” in determining the deference federal courts owe to
state law and in determining the limits of the federal
rulemaking power under the “substantive rights proviso” of the
Rules Enabling Act.100 Erie doctrine has alternated cyclically
between formalism and functionalism as the Court has
attempted to accommodate the tension between formalism’s
emphasis on predictability and certainty in the application of
Erie doctrine versus functionalism’s premium on “getting it
right” in the individual case to achieve the just result.101 The
shifting nature of Erie doctrine also reflects the Court’s
attempt, in each case, to calibrate the appropriate judicial
balance of power between state and federal sovereign interests.
The challenge of resolving this tension has frequently produced
five-to-four decisions or an indeterminate set of majority,
plurality and dissenting opinions.102 This occurred again in the
98. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
99. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
101. See The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19, at 1007 (“III.

The Roots of Shady Grove: “Erie” Jurisprudence and the Oscillating
Pendulum of Judicial Federalism Between Federal and State
Interests”).
102. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415
(1996) (Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion, in which The Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
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Court’s most recent “Erie” offering in Shady Grove and, most
recently, in Hollingsworth v. Perry, effectively an “Erie”
decision in all-but-name.
In 1938, Erie realigned the federal/state judicial balance of
power in overruling 100 years of precedent under Swift v.
Tyson by re-interpreting the Rules of Decision Act’s mandate
that federal courts apply “[t]he laws of the several States” to
include state substantive case law as well as statutory law.103
After Erie, federal courts could no longer refuse, in the absence
of controlling federal constitutional provisions, treaties or
statutes, to apply the same state substantive law that a state
court would apply a block away. As observed by one
commentator, Erie doctrine is, at its core, “about procedural
federalism.”104
In Guaranty Trust, decided seven years after Erie, the
Court rejected a rigid formalist approach to determining
whether a given state law was “substantive” in favor of a
functional analysis that gave effect to the core policy
underlying Erie “that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a
State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially
different result.”105 Guaranty Trust’s outcome determinative
test continued to shift the judicial balance of judicial power in
the direction of respect for state interests by expanding the
meaning of “substantive” beyond its technical definition to
include state procedural law that significantly affects the
enforcement of state substantive rights. Concern by many
joined.); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 395-96 (2010) (“Justice SCALIA announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I
and II-A, an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and II-D, in which
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice THOMAS, and Justice SOTOMAYOR
join, and an opinion with respect to Part II-C, in which THE CHIEF
JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join. . . . Justice Ginsburg filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito
joined.”).
103. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938); see 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (2012).
104. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What
Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?),
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 308 (2008).
105. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 320 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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commentators that the balance had now shifted too far in the
state direction was raised by three post-Guaranty Trust
decisions—Woods, Cohen, and Ragan—in which the Court
“seemed committed to applying this outcome determinative test
to its farthest reach” that threatened to neglect the federal
judicial system’s interest in the uniform application of federal
procedural rules promulgated under the authority of the Rules
Enabling Act.106
These three decisions transformed Guaranty Trust’s
functionalist approach into a formalist one that asks: Is the
choice of competing rules as viewed by the court post-hoc
outcome determinative? The answer literally will be yes in
almost every case. Therefore, the federal rule must almost
always yield to state law. As noted by Professor John Hart Ely:
[I]t would seem that any rule can be said to have
both “procedural effects,” affecting the way in
which litigation is conducted, and “substantive
effects,” affecting society’s distribution of risks
and rewards. Thus, an “effects test” would seem
destined either to unintelligibility or to the
invalidation of every Federal Rule, thereby
rendering the Enabling Act entirely selfdefeating.107
In an effort to restore equilibrium to the balance between
federal and state interests, and in reaction to the perceived
threat to “the integrity and independence of the federal
courts[,]”108 the Court explicitly adopted an interest-balancing
approach in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc.109 As
Professor Freer comments, “[b]y recognizing three interests—
(1) some federal systemic interest, (2) the state interest in
106. See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, at § 4508
(“In the wake of these three 1949 decisions many observers believed
that there was no longer much, if any, room for independent
regulation of procedure.”).
107. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693, 724 n.170 (1974) (citation omitted).
108. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After
Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1647 (1998).
109. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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governing the primary activity of citizens, and (3) the litigant
interest in uniformity of outcome—and by embracing the
concept of balancing, the Court reinvigorated principles of
federalism in the vertical choice of law equation.”110 In
evaluating the state’s interest, Byrd identified a type of state
procedural law that is sufficiently “bound up with [statecreated] rights and obligations in such a way that its
application in the federal court is required.”111 This concept of
“bound up” state procedure reappeared most recently in Justice
Stevens’ plurality opinion in Shady Grove112 and, effectively, in
Justice Kennedy’s Hollingsworth dissent. Justice Kennedy
views the authority to assert the State’s interest in defending
challenged initiatives, granted by California law to official
initiative proponents, as essential to the integrity of
California’s initiative process. As written elsewhere, this
interest-balancing approach to conflicting federal/state
interests also sheds light on the Court’s multiple opinions in
Shady Grove as it does in Hollingsworth.113 Byrd’s interestbalancing approach, in Professor Freer’s and Professor Arthur’s
view, “actually explains the results in cases in which the Court
did not cite it.”114
In 1965, the Erie pendulum moved even further toward the
federal interest115 in horizontal procedural uniformity at the
110. Freer, supra note 108, at 1651 (footnotes omitted).
111. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 157-61. In his plurality

opinion, Justice Stevens inquired whether an exception to New York’s
state’s class action rule stating that an action to recover a statutory
penalty may not be maintained as class action was “so intertwined
with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the
state-created right.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
113. The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19, at 1006 (“In
calibrating the judicial balance of power between federal and state
interests, the Court’s majority [in Shady Grove] reaffirmed . . . the
vitality of the [Rules Enabling Act’s] policy of federal procedural
uniformity in diversity actions, by holding that Rule 23 . . . controlled
the issue in dispute, was valid, and, therefore, preempted New York’s
conflicting, and outcome determinative, class action rule.”).
114. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 62.
115. See Ely, supra note 107, at 696 (“The Court [after Byrd]
could not leave such sensible moderation alone, however, and in 1965,
the pendulum that had begun in Byrd to swing back toward the
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expense of vertical substantive-outcome uniformity.116 Hanna
purported to insulate Federal Rules, and by implication other
federal directives, that are on point from Erie analysis by
holding that they must be applied by federal courts over
conflicting and outcome determinative state law.117 However,
because only federal directives that are broad enough to control
the issue in dispute can preempt conflicting state law, Hanna’s
seemingly inflexible, formalist rule leaves room for respecting
integrally bound up state procedural law by narrowly
construing the scope of the federal law in question.118 Hence,
even after Hanna, the Court still engages in the Byrd-style
exercise of balancing federal and state interests by choosing to
interpret arguably applicable federal directives broadly or
narrowly and did so, implicitly, in Hollingsworth.
As expressed by Professors Freer and Arthur:
The starting point in vertical choice of law
analysis is whether a federal directive applies.
teaching of Erie swung too far, indeed perhaps beyond its 1938
starting place, in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court in
Hanna v. Plumer.”).
116. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) ("‘One of
the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about
uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This
is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of
legal proceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally
exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers
Congress expressly conferred in the Rules.’”).
117. See id. at 473-74 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of
enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the
Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress'
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act. Rule 4(d)(1) is
valid, and controls the instant case.”).
118. Hanna itself recognizes that Erie applies if the federal rule is
not broad enough to control the issue in dispute. Id. at 470 (“The Erie
rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that
there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by
one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not
that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an
inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule
was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being
no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded
the enforcement of state law.”).
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The decision on this point determines which
regime—pro-federal or pro-state—will apply. . . .
Through the years, the Court has been anything
but consistent in its approach to the important
funneling function of assessing the breadth of a
Federal Rule.119
By interpreting the scope of a federal directive narrowly to
avoid conflict with state law that is integrally bound up with
the enforcement of substantive state rights or broadly to
preempt state law, the Court has, in some cases, deferred to
state substantive policy.120 In other cases, the Court has
favored federal interests over competing state interests by
broadly construing federal law, in formalist, plain-meaning-ofthe-text fashion, to govern the issue in dispute.121 The Court’s
opinion in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. exemplifies the
formalist approach where the Court asserted: “The Federal
Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision
119. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 70. Also see Kevin M.
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 987, 1001 (2011) (responding to “those scholars who hold that
Byrd is not central to the unguided Erie choice”: “First, Hanna did
not say it was overruling Byrd, and instead cited it twice for support.
Second, the passage of Hanna most inconsistent with the Byrd
holding lies in a footnote to dicta. Third, the focus of those dicta was
to straighten out an error of the old outcome-determinative test, not
to inter Erie’s greater concern with meshing state and federal
interests. Fourth, subsequent lower court cases continued regularly to
cite Byrd, often in a way essential to their results. Fifth, the Supreme
Court in Gasperini applied Byrd to reach its result that the federal
government’s interests in controlling its courts’ standard of appellate
review outweighed News York’s substantive interests. It resurrected
Byrd’s term of ‘essential characteristics’ of the federal system, which
means nothing more than an affirmative countervailing consideration
of sufficient weight to overcome the interests in favor of applying
state law.”)
120. See id. (“At least six times, the Court has found that a
Federal Rule did not apply—in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., Palmer, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
Walker, Semtek International v. Lockheed Martin Corp., and
Gasperini.”).
121. See id. (“In four cases before Shady Grove, the Court found
that a Federal Rule was on point—in Sibbach v. Wilson, Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, Burlington Northern Railroad v.
Woods, and Hanna.”).
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with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the
analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.” 122 The Court’s
opinion in Gasperini illustrates the functionalist approach to
accommodate both federal and state interests in the same
decision,123 giving rise to speculation by one commentator that
the Court “may have replaced the [formalist] search for ‘plain
meaning’ with a heightened sensitivity to potential impact on
state policy.”124
In Gasperini, the Erie pendulum reversed course once
again, swinging in the direction of accommodating state
interests by narrowly construing a Federal Rule of Procedure to
avoid a collision with a state procedural rule. The plaintiff in
Gasperini won a $450,000 jury verdict in a diversity suit.125
The defendant moved, under Federal Rule 59, for a new trial on
the grounds that the damage award was excessive.126 Rule
59(a)(1)(A) provides that “[t]he court may . . . grant a new trial .
. . for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court[.]”127 Traditionally,
one of those reasons is verdict-excessiveness, but Rule 59 does
not specify the applicable standard for determining whether
the jury’s damage award is excessive. In scrutinizing jury
awards, federal trial judges have ordered new trials on grounds
of excessive damages only when the verdict is so unreasonable
that it “shock[s] the conscience[.]”128 New York’s CPLR §
5501(c), a tort-reform measure in procedural garb designed to
curb runaway jury awards, gave New York’s appellate courts
122. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9
(1980) (“The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a
direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then
the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.”).
123. See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 9, at § 4511
(Supp. 2013) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Gasperini is a reasonable
attempt to perform the balancing of interests required by Byrd.”).
124. Freer, supra note 108, at 1643.
125. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 420
(1996).
126. Id. at 420, 422 (“Before 1986, state and federal courts in New
York generally invoked the same judge-made formulation in
responding to excessiveness attacks on jury verdicts: courts would not
disturb an award unless the amount was so exorbitant that it
‘shocked the conscience of the court.’”).
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
128. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
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greater authority to scrutinize jury awards by permitting a new
trial if an award “deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation.”129 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, framed the following
Erie-Hanna issue: “This case presents an important question
regarding the standard a federal court uses to measure the
alleged excessiveness of a jury’s verdict in an action for
damages based on state law.”130
Justice Ginsburg gave scant attention to the threshold
question under Hanna whether Rule 59 was broad enough to
control the standard for determining excessiveness, addressing
the issue indirectly in a footnote directed at Justice Scalia’s
dissent. She noted, “Justice Scalia finds in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59 a ‘federal standard’ for new trial motions in
‘direct collision’ with, and ‘leaving no room for the operation of,’
a state law like CPLR § 5501.”131 While acknowledging that it
is “indeed ‘Hornbook’ law that a most usual ground for a Rule
59 motion is that ‘the damages are excessive[,]’”132 Justice
Ginsburg’s footnote continued: “Whether damages are
excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law.
And there is no candidate for that governance other than the
law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of New
York.”133 In justifying this narrow interpretation of Rule 59,
Justice Ginsburg noted that “[f]ederal courts have interpreted
the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state
interests and regulatory policies.”134 She will, again, in her
dissenting opinion in Shady Grove—and to a more limited
extent, Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in that case—
urge this same restraint in interpreting federal law to
accommodate state law. However, seventeen years later, in
Hollingsworth, Justice Ginsburg cast her vote with the
majority of Justices who declined to interpret federal standing
doctrine under Article III “with sensitivity” to the interests of
129. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added).
130. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422.
131. Id. at 437 n.22 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Burlington N.

R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987)).
132. Id. (citations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 427 n.7.

33

664

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

California in the integrity of the State’s hallowed initiative
process. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Hollingsworth argued
that federal standing doctrine does not control the threshold
issue whether official initiative proponents are authorized to
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity.
This Article argues in Part IV that Hollingsworth, viewed
from an Erie perspective, is similar to Gasperini because, in
both cases, the textual sources of the applicable legal principles
did not expressly address the issues-in-dispute and, therefore,
did not lend themselves to an inflexible, formalist approach. In
such cases, where federal decisional law—rather than literal
text—provides the applicable legal principles, Gasperini
provides credible support for employing a Byrd-style analysis
to critically evaluate the Court’s opinions in Hollingsworth. As
observed by Professor Freer: “Gasperini shows that Byrd
survives Hanna and serves at least to identify federal systemic
interests.”135 Professor Rowe, commenting on Gasperini’s
influence on Erie-Hanna doctrine, noted a limited role for
Byrd-balancing methodology in decisional rule cases where “an
‘essential characteristic’ of the federal judicial system
presenting a ‘countervailing federal interest’ is involved.”136
In Gasperini, the majority implicitly rejected Justice
Scalia’s dissenting view that the disruption of the judge-jury
relationship in federal court, that would be caused by
“changing the standard by which trial judges review jury

135. Freer, supra note 108, at 1660 (“[Gasperini] is frustratingly
mum, though, about Byrd’s future in any larger sense . . . . But,
reading between the lines of Gasperini, we can find that Byrd—writ
large—may have a strong future.”).
136. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does
Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job
in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 1014
(1998) (“[T]he Hanna ‘twin aims’ approach remains applicable to such
decisional-rule cases – unless an ‘essential characteristic’ of the
federal judicial system presenting a ‘countervailing federal interest’ is
involved. In such cases Byrd and Gasperini call for a broadening
beyond the ‘twin aims’ version of ‘outcome determination’ analysis to
include consideration of the nature and weight of the state’s interest
in application of its own rule in federal court, with particular focus on
whether it is ‘bound up with’ clearly substantive state-law rights and
an eye to whether the state or federal interest should prevail or if the
two can be accommodated.”).
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verdicts,” 137 qualified as an “essential characteristic” of the
federal trial courts that would trigger Byrd’s interest-balancing
analysis. In Hollingsworth, the overriding essential
characteristic was the federal judiciary’s limited Article III role
among the three branches of the federal government. Both
Gasperini and Hollingsworth involved an “essential
characteristic” of the federal judicial system presenting a
“countervailing federal interest” in which decisional law gives
content to vaguely worded text.138 In Gasperini, federal
decisional law—not the literal text of Federal Rule 59—
provides the precedent for the shocks the conscience standard.
In Hollingsworth, federal decisional law—not the literal text of
Article III—provides the governing law on federal standing.139
Both cases involve a state rule integrally bound up with state
substantive rights. In Gasperini, CPLR § 5501(c) was a
procedural mechanism, in Professor Rowe’s words, “to control
something that is very much a matter of state substantive law,
the amounts of compensatory damages recoverable on statelaw claims . . . .”140 In Hollingsworth, state decisional law
authorizing initiative proponents to assert the State’s interest
in the initiative’s validity is bound up with the integrity of the
State’s initiative process.
Professor Rowe cautions that the omission of an explicit
reference to Byrd in that part of the Gasperini Court’s opinion
137. “But the scope of the Court's concern is oddly circumscribed.
The ‘essential characteristic’ of the federal jury, and, more
specifically, the role of the federal trial court in reviewing jury
judgments, apparently counts for little. The Court approves the
‘accommodation’ achieved by having district courts review jury
verdicts under the ‘deviates materially’ standard, because it regards
that as a means of giving effect to the State's purposes ‘without
disrupting the federal system,’ ante, at 437. But changing the
standard by which trial judges review jury verdicts does disrupt the
federal system, and is plainly inconsistent with the ‘strong federal
policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury
relationship in the federal court.’ Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, 78 S. Ct. 893
(1958). “The Court's opinion does not even acknowledge, let alone
address, this dislocation.” 515 U.S. at 462 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
138. See id.; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013);
Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
140. Rowe, supra note 136, at 998.
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that addressed the applicable standard of review for verdict
excessiveness indicates “the seeming limit on the scope of
Byrd’s applicability”141 and that “Byrd plays no role in the
choice of standard for verdict-excessiveness.”142 He concludes
that this omission sends “the message still surprisingly often
ignored that the place to start in a federal decisional-law case
is with the Hanna ‘twin aims’ formulation, and not with Byrd’s
balancing approach.”143 While it is true that “Erie” analysis
does not start with Byrd, neither does it necessarily stop with
the Hanna “twin aims” version of the outcome determinative
test.144 It is plausible to conclude that the Gasperini majority
did not explicitly mention Byrd because—having by implication
determined that that the disruption of the judge-jury
relationship was not sufficiently compelling to constitute an
overriding essential characteristic of the federal judicial
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1000.
On the continuing relevance of Byrd in “Erie” analysis postGasperini, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 341-42 (6th
ed. 2012) (emphasis added):
141.
142.
143.
144.

If there is no conflict between state and federal law,
both are to be applied. But if state and federal law are
inconsistent, the following questions must be asked:
First, is there a valid federal statute or federal rule of
procedure on point, such as a provision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of
Appellate procedure? If so, then the federal law is to
be applied, even if there is conflicting state law. If
there is no valid statute or rule of procedure, the
second question is whether the application of the state
law in question is likely to determine the outcome of
the lawsuit. If the state law is not outcome
determinative, then federal law is used. But if the
state law is deemed to be outcome determinative, then
the third question is asked: Is there an overriding
federal interest justifying the application of federal
law? If state law is outcome determinative and there is
no countervailing federal interest, then state law
controls. Otherwise, federal law is applied. In applying
this test, federal courts are to be guided by the goals
of the Erie doctrine, which are to prevent forum
shopping and the inequitable administration of
justice.
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system145—it did not have to engage in a Byrd-balancing
analysis. This conclusion is bolstered by the Court’s explicit
invocation of Byrd in that aspect of its opinion dealing with the
allocation of authority between federal trial and appellate
courts in applying the excessiveness standard where the
majority held that the Second Circuit erred in applying the
New York’s statute’s de novo standard of appellate review
instead of the federal abuse of discretion standard: “[T]he
Second Circuit did not attend to ‘an essential characteristic of
[the federal-court] system,’ (cite omitted) when it used § 5501(c)
as ‘the standard for [federal] appellate review’ (cite omitted).”146
Fourteen years after Gasperini, the balance of federal/state
interests shifted back toward the federal judiciary’s interest in
regulating procedure. This occurred when a five-Justice
majority ruled in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,147 that the federal class action rule preempted a
conflicting New York state class action rule that would have
barred the state law claim-in-suit from being maintained as a
class action in New York state court. The Court fractured into
essentially three different views about the proper approach to
balancing state and federal interests in resolving vertical

145. Rowe, supra note 136 at 999, note 150 (“The Gasperini Court
speaks early in part III.B of its opinion, once it has resolved the
choice of standard in favor of the state rule and moved on to the trialappeal allocation of responsibility for the standard's application, of
Byrd's having said that the "'outcome-determination' test was an
insufficient guide in cases presenting countervailing federal
interests." Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2222. The implication seems
strong that the Court saw no federal interest sufficient to invoke Byrd
in the content of the standard itself in this case, as opposed to the
allocation of responsibility for its application within the federal
judicial structure.”); Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of
Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and
Gasperini, 46 Kan. L. Rev. 751, 771 (1998) (commenting on
Gasperini’s impact on Byrd: “[W]ith respect to the district court’s
standard for reviewing verdicts, the Court gave no consideration to
whether there were countervailing federal interests. One could argue
that a lower standard for new trials may increase the number of
trials in federal court and impose significant burdens. This may not
be a sufficiently large or likely federal interest, but it would have
been helpful for the Court to so state.”).
146. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431.
147. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
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choice of law issues.148 Professors Freer and Arthur
commented, “[e]ach of the three opinions in Shady Grove
reflects [Byrd’s] influence, if not its command.”149
The majority and dissenting Justices disagreed about
whether the federal class action rule was broad enough in
scope to govern the issue-in-dispute. The majority broadly
construed Federal Rule 23 by applying a formalist, plain-text
approach to the vertical choice of law issue, an approach
dictated by the plain-text, literal wording of the two competing
class action rules which both literally addressed the same
issue—whether Shady Grove was authorized to “maintain” a
class action. The federal rule thereby preempted the conflicting
state procedure, transforming, in the words of Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, “a $500 case into a $5,000,000
award, although the State creating the right to recover has
proscribed this alchemy.”150 The Court effectively decided that
the federal interest, reflected in the Rules Enabling Act, in
prescribing a uniform procedural framework for civil litigation
across all federal district courts, outweighed what Justice
Ginsburg explained in her dissenting opinion as “New York’s
legitimate interest in keeping certain monetary awards
reasonably bounded”151 by barring the use of the class action
device to recover a statutory penalty created by state law.
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion articulated a rigidly formalist,
textual approach, applying the literal words of both class action
rules that left no room for an inquiry into the legislature’s
intent in enacting the state class action rule. Justice Stevens,
who agreed with the plurality that the two class action rules
were literally in conflict, adopted a more flexible version of
plain-text statutory analysis in resolving vertical choice of law
issues that would leave some room for applying “bound up”
state procedure.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by three other Justices,
advocated a functionalist approach—reminiscent of Guaranty
Trust’s outcome determinative test—”to interpret Federal
148. See The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19.
149. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 62.
150. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 559 U.S. at 436 (Ginsburg,

J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 437.
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Rules with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state
regulatory policies.”152 The dissent characterized the policy
behind New York’s class action rule as essentially substantive
in nature which should be accommodated by narrowly
construing Federal Rule 23 to avoid a conflict with New York’s
class action rule.153 Just as Justice Kennedy’s dissent, three
years later in Hollingsworth, will support the Ninth Circuit’s
narrow interpretation of the scope of Article III’s standing
jurisprudence by framing the authority of the initiative
proponents to assert the State’s interest in Proposition 8’s
validity as a threshold question to be resolved by applying
California state law, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove
agreed with the Second Circuit’s view that New York’s class
action rule addressed (in Justice Scalia’s words characterizing
the position of the dissent) “an antecedent question”:
Rule 23 . . . concerns only the criteria for
determining whether a given class can and
should be certified; section 901(b) [of New York’s
class action rule], on the other hand, addresses
an antecedent question: whether the particular
type of claim is eligible for class treatment in the
first place—a question on which Rule 23 is
silent.154
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Shady Grove opted
for a “plain textual meaning” approach to the interpretation of
state statutes less rigid than that embraced by Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion, leaving some room for applying bound-up
state rules. In Justice Stevens’ interpretation of the Rules
Enabling Act’s substantive rights proviso, “[i]n order to
displace a federal rule, there must be more than just a
152. Id.
153. See id. at 449 (“The absence of an inevitable collision
between Rule 23 and § 901(b) becomes evident once it is comprehended

that a federal court sitting in diversity can accord due respect to both
state and federal prescriptions.”); see also id. at 451 (“By finding a
conflict without considering whether Rule 23 rationally should be read
to avoid any collision, the Court unwisely and unnecessarily retreats
from the federalism principles undergirding Erie.”).
154. Id. at 399 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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possibility that the state rule is different than it appears.”155 To
overcome the use of a state statute’s “plain text[]” as a default
tool of interpretation, Justice Stevens would require that
legislative history clearly show the legislature’s intent to use
procedure to change the substantive law of the State,
something akin to Byrd’s characterization of state procedure
that is integrally bound up with the enforcement of state
substantive rights.156 Rejecting the dissent’s advocacy of the
very functionalist “outcome determinative test,” Justice
Stevens adopted a more modified functionalist standard that
“distinguish[es] between procedural rules adopted for some
policy reason and seemingly procedural rules that are
intimately bound up in the scope of a substantive right or
remedy.”157 In deciding whether New York’s competing class
action rule was “substantive,” such that Federal Rule 23 could
not validly preempt the state rule, he inquired, in Byrd’s
terminology, whether the state rule is “so intertwined with a
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the
state-created right”158 and found that it was not.159 Professors
Freer and Arthur have commented that Justice Ginsburg’s
dissenting opinion also applies Byrd’s “bound up” approach in
her “functional analysis of the New York statute”160 increasing
to five the Justices in Shady Grove “willing to engage in the
‘bound up’ analysis suggested by Byrd.”161
As discussed in Part IV, the Hollingsworth Court’s
majority and dissenting opinions reflect this interest-balancing
approach to the vertical choice of law issue in dispute. The
majority broadly construed the scope of federal standing
jurisprudence to govern the authority of the initiative

Id. at 436 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
Id. at 423.
See id. at 436 (“But given that there are two plausible
competing narratives, it seems obvious to me that we should respect
the plain textual reading of § 901(b), a rule in New York's procedural
code about when to certify class actions brought under any source of
law, and respect Congress' decision that Rule 23 governs class
certification in federal courts.”).
160. Freer & Arthur, supra note 35, at 75.
161. Id. at 76.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4

40

2014]

“STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE

671

proponents to assert the State’s interest in Proposition 8’s
validity. By contrast, the dissent narrowly construed standing
doctrine to avoid a conflict with California state law to
accommodate the state interest in the integrity of California’s
initiative process by characterizing the issue of the proponent’s
authority as a threshold question governed by state law.
Though Erie is not mentioned in either the majority or
dissenting opinions, the divergent views on the standing issue
reflect, at bottom, a difference over the “proper balance of the
core Erie interests.”162
IV. A Critical Assessment of the Federal-State Balance of
Interests in Hollingsworth v. Perry
As discussed in Part III, the decision whether to narrowly
or broadly construe the scope of a federal rule, statute, or
constitutional provision is often determined by how the Court
balances state interests against federal interests. If the Court
decides that state interests weigh more heavily, then it will
narrowly construe the federal directive in order to give effect to
the state law. If federal interests are deemed to outweigh state
interests and outcome difference, the Court will broadly
construe the federal directive. What follows is a critical
analysis of Hollingsworth’s majority and dissenting opinions in
light of the Byrd-balancing factors: (1) the federal systemic
interest, (2) the state interest in governing the primary activity
of citizens, and (3) the litigant interest in uniformity of
outcome.163
The split between the majority and dissenting Justices in
Hollingsworth can be interpreted, from an Erie perspective, as
a difference of opinion over the proper balance between
California’s state interest in conferring authority on
Proposition 8’s initiative proponents to defend that initiative
when state officials refused to do so, and the federal interest in
confining the exercise of the federal judicial power within the
constitutional limits imposed by Article III’s case-orcontroversy provision. In effect, and without saying so
162. Id. at 78.
163. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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explicitly, the Justices implicitly engaged in a Byrd-style
weighing of federal and state interests as it did in the Court’s
most recent Erie decisions in Gasperini and Shady Grove.
Viewed in this light, Hollingsworth is the latest in a tortuous
line of Supreme Court decisions often referred to as Erie’s
progeny.
No one disputes that federal standing under Article III
requires “the litigant to prove that he has suffered a concrete
and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct”164 or that the State of California suffered a
particularized injury when the district court declared
Proposition 8 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its
enforcement.165 Because “[t]he exclusive basis of [the Ninth
Circuit’s] holding that Proponents possess Article III standing
is their authority to assert the interests of the State of
California, rather than any authority they might have to assert
particularized interests of their own,”166 the federal standing
issue before the U.S Supreme Court focused exclusively on
whether the proponents were qualified to assert the State’s
particularized interest. Therefore, the Erie issue that divided
the Justices in Hollingsworth essentially turned on whether
the federal courts should be free to second-guess, and
consequently to override, the judgment of a state’s highest
court about the qualifications of the initiative’s proponents to
represent the state’s interest in federal court. This issue, in
turn, homed in on whether the proponents would be advocating
the state’s particularized interest or their own generalized
grievance. Framing the issue in terms of the judicial balance of
power in our federal system, does the federal judiciary or
California’s judiciary get to decide whether initiative
proponents are qualified to assert a state’s particularized
interest in defending an initiative’s validity in federal court?
The majority ruled that Article III standing precedent

164. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013)
(emphasis added).
165. See id. at 2664 (“No one doubts that a State has a cognizable
interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by
a judicial decision declaring a state law unconstitutional.”).
166. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis omitted).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/4

42

2014]

“STANDING” IN THE SHADOW OF ERIE

673

controls this issue, not California law as interpreted by the
state’s high court, and that federal standing jurisprudence
imposes a formal “agency” requirement on a proponent’s
authority to represent the State’s interest in federal court.
Noting that “[n]either the California Supreme Court nor the
Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the
State, and [that] they plainly do not qualify as such,” the Court
held they did not have Article III standing. Without a formal
agency
relationship
that
assured
the
proponents’
accountability, as fiduciaries, to the State, the Court feared
that the proponents’ interests were unhinged from the State’s,
freeing them to assert their own generalized ideological
views.167 The majority also seems to have minimized the harm
to the State’s interest in defending Proposition 8, having been
made aware of the “variety of ways for a state to guarantee a
defense of its initiatives” described in Walter Dellinger’s
amicus brief in support of Respondents on the standing
issue.168 This expansive interpretation of Article III standing
doctrine to reach what the Ninth Circuit called a “question[]

167. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666-67 (“[T]he most basic
features of an agency relationship are missing here. . . . [P]etitioners
answer to no one; they decide for themselves, with no review, what
arguments to make and how to make them. Unlike California’s
attorney general, they are not elected at regular intervals—or elected
at all. No provision provides for their removal. As one amicus
explains, ‘the proponents apparently have an unelected appointment
for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative,
however, and to whatever extent they choose to defend it.’ . . . They
are free to pursue a purely ideological commitment to the law’s
constitutionality without the need to take cognizance of resource
constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential ramifications for
other state priorities.”).
168. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 30; see also
Marty Lederman, Revisiting the Court’s Several Options in the
California Marriage Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2013, 4:54 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/revisiting-the-courts-severaloptions-in-the-california-marriage-case/ (“As Justice Breyer noted . . .
the Dellinger brief describes several ways in which California law
could be amended to prevent [executive officials in California to
effectively thwart the initiative process], including by providing for an
independent counsel who would be required to act as a fiduciary of
the state with the responsibility of defending initiatives when the
Attorney General declines to do so.”).
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antecedent to determining federal standing”169 was driven—at
least on the surface—by the majority’s overriding concern with
protecting “vital [federal] interests going to the role of the
Judiciary in our system of separated powers.”170 To protect
these vital federal interests, the Court placed Article III limits
on the power of state law to, in Professor Lederman’s words,
“expand the category of persons entitled to represent the state’s
interests in federal court.”171 “And no matter its reasons,” the
Court’s Opinion affirmed, “the fact that a State thinks a
private party should have standing to seek relief for a
generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the
contrary.”172
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion offered a contrasting
balance-of-power assessment, arguing that the State’s
overriding interest in preserving “the integrity of its initiative
process[]”173 requires that California state law, not federal
standing doctrine, control the issue of the proponents’
qualifications to represent the State’s interest in federal court:
[T]he Court today concludes that this statedefined status and this state-conferred right fall
short of meeting federal requirements because
the proponents cannot point to a formal
delegation of authority that tracks the
requirements of the Restatement of Agency. But
the State Supreme Court’s definition of
proponents’ powers is binding on this Court. And
that definition is fully sufficient to establish the
standing and adversity that are requisites for
justiciability under Article III of the United
States Constitution.174
Addressing the qualifications of the initiative proponents to
represent the State’s interest, Justice Kennedy converted what
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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Perry, 671 F.3d at 1074.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2668.
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the majority viewed as “deficiencies in the proponents’
connection to the State government . . . “— that proponents
who are not formally appointed as agents of the State would
represent their own generalized interest—into “essential
qualifications to defend the initiative system[]” since “[t]he very
object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking
process that does not depend upon state officials.”175 He also
challenged the relevance of the Restatement’s concept of a
formal agency relationship to “an agent representing a
principal composed of nearly 40 million residents of a State.”176
Did the Court “get it right” from the Erie perspective of
calibrating the appropriate judicial balance of power in vertical
federalism? A critical analysis of the Court’s Opinion in light of
Erie jurisprudence, summarized in Part III, indicates that the
Court’s majority overstated the harm to the federal interest—
maintaining the separation of powers structure of the federal
government—that would accrue from conferring federal
standing on the proponents, and understated the impairment
of California’s interest—maintaining the integrity of the
People’s initiative power as an integral part of the State’s
governmental structure—that was caused by the Court’s denial
of standing. Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion makes a
compelling case for privileging California’s interest in the
integrity of its initiative process over competing federal
interests. Each state has a sovereign interest within the federal
system in determining its own governmental structure.
Whatever its shortcomings, the initiative process in California
is sacrosanct, accurately described by Justice Kennedy as “one
of the cornerstones of the State’s governmental structure.”177
As noted by the Ninth Circuit panel, the question of the
proponents’ authority to defend the validity of Proposition 8 is
integral to the balance of power within California’s
governmental organization under the State’s Constitution.178
Id. at 2670.
Id. at 2671.
Id.
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir.
2011) (“Rather than rely on our own understanding of this balance of
power under the California Constitution, however, we certify the
question so that the Court may provide an authoritative answer as to
the rights, interests, and authority under California law of the official
175.
176.
177.
178.
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The California Supreme Court determined that the power of
the People to “to alter or reform” the structure of state
government, set forth in Article II, section 1 of the California
Constitution, “reflects a basic precept of [California’s]
governmental system[.]”179 The Court observed that the
initiative power is rooted in that basic precept180 and affirmed
that “[t]he primary purpose of the initiative was to afford the
people the ability to propose and to adopt constitutional
amendments or statutory provisions that their elected public
officials had refused or declined to adopt.”181
For good or ill, California’s initiative power is an integral
part of the State’s governmental structure that provides,
through direct democracy, a counterweight to the power of
elected officials. The official proponents’ authority under
California law to defend an initiative when state officials refuse
to do so is, in Byrd’s terminology, “bound up”182 with the
integrity of that process. As Justice Kennedy observed, “[t]he
very object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking
process that does not depend upon state officials.”183 The
California Supreme Court determined that “this purpose is
undermined if the very officials the initiative process seeks to
proponents of an initiative measure to defend its validity upon its
enactment in the case of a challenge to its constitutionality, where
the state officials charged with that duty refuse to execute it.”).
179. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011).
180. See id. (“Although California’s original 1849 Constitution
declared that ‘[a]ll political power is inherent in the people,’ it was not
until 60 years later—in 1911—that the California Constitution was
amended to afford the voters of California the authority to directly
propose and adopt state constitutional amendments and statutory
provisions through the initial power.”).
181. Id.
182. See Katz, supra note 7, at 1332 (recognizing the “bound-up”
connection between standing-related issues and the enforcement of
substantive rights was recognized in the reverse-Erie context: “The
fact that Congress may neglect to assign standing limits to its
legislation does not imply that these limits are not ‘bound up’ in the
federal right. In the Erie and reverse-Erie contexts, the Court
determines if a certain rule should always accompany a substantive
right by asking whether the rule is integral to the substantive right
or merely incidental to the forum which normally adjudicates the
right.”).
183. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2013)
(Kennedy, J. dissenting).
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circumvent are the only parties who can defend an enacted
initiative when it is challenged in a legal proceeding.”184 In
light of the independent nature of the people’s initiative power
that allows voters to bypass the legislative and executive
branches, these enforcement mechanisms should not be
dependent on action by state officials whose potential “residual
hostility or indifference” to the initiative might “prevent a full
and robust defense of the measure” in court.185 Byrd teaches
that “bound up” state procedure—here, the proponents’
authority to assert the State’s substantive interest—should be
applied by federal courts. Justice Kennedy affirmed that the
California Supreme Court is best qualified to judge how best to
defend that interest: “And if the Court’s concern is that the
proponents are unaccountable, that fear is neither well founded
nor sufficient to overcome the contrary judgment of the State
Supreme Court.”186
Addressing the majority’s requirement that only textual
delegation of authority consistent with the Restatement will
suffice to confer federal standing, the dissent—correctly, in my
view—responds that it is “not for [the U.S. Supreme Court] to
say that a State must determine the substance and meaning of
its laws by statute, or by judicial decision, or by a combination
of the two. That, too, is for the State to decide.”187
The Court’s majority implicitly decided that federal
separation of powers concerns outweighed what it perceived to
be the negligible impact on California’s interest in selfgovernment. To allow “a private party . . . [to] have standing to
seek relief for a generalized grievance” in contravention of
“[t]he Article III requirement that a party invoking the
jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal,
particularized injury[,]” the Chief Justice declared, threatens
“vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system
of separated powers . . . . States cannot alter that role simply
by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a

184. Id. at 2671.
185. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011).
186. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (Kennedy,

dissenting).
187. Id. at 2669 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

J.,
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ticket to the federal courthouse.”188 He characterized that
federal interest as an “overriding and time-honored concern
about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper
constitutional sphere[.]”189
This view reflects a “slippery slope” concern that, as
expressed in Walter Dellinger’s amicus brief, “the Article III
principle that federal courts cannot serve as a forum for the
airing of generalized grievances would be drained of any
practical meaning” if “a state can transform a generalized
interest in a law’s enforcement from an insufficient basis for
Article III standing into a cognizable Article III injury simply
by relabeling it as the state’s interest.”190 The amicus brief
argued, and apparently persuaded the majority, that “[t]he
adoption of common-law agency as a limit on who can assert
the state’s interest is necessary to preserve the federal courts’
Article III role.”191 But would the Hollingsworth Court’s
application of the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of
state law have unleashed a “parade of horribles”192 that would
threaten to undermine the foundation of Article III standing?
Is a strict, formalist application of standing law to determine
the authority of initiative proponents to represent the State’s
interest in federal court required to preserve the separation-ofpowers structure of the federal government?
188. Id. at 2667; see also id. at 2661 (“The doctrine of standing,
we recently explained, ‘serves to prevent the judicial process from
being used to usurp the powers of the political branches. In light of
this ‘overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the
Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere, we must
put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of [an]
important dispute and to “settle” it for the sake of convenience and
efficiency.’”).
189. Id. at 2661 (emphasis added) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 820 (1997)).
190. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 4 (emphasis
added).
191. Id. at 28.
192. See Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58 (referring to
the concern expressed by the City and County of San Francisco’s
concern expressed to the California Supreme Court in Perry v. Brown
about the “inevitable parade of horribles” that would flow from a
ruling untethered from text that would provide “no principled way to
draw a line between delegating Proponents the authority to appeal on
behalf of the State and delegating Proponents other decisions.”).
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A formalist approach to interpreting legal doctrine can, at
times, be justified by functional considerations such as the
need to preserve the benefits of a uniform procedural
framework for federal court litigation as envisioned by the
Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.193
The Court’s opinion in Shady Grove, correctly in my view,
chose to weight more heavily the federal judiciary’s interest in
horizontal rules uniformity over each state’s interest in vertical
substantive law uniformity.194 Justice Scalia’s formalist
interpretation of Rule 23 prevailed over Justice Ginsburg’s
functionalist approach—reminiscent of Guaranty Trust’s
outcome determination test—that would threaten the uniform
application of the Federal Rules.
Unlike Rule 23, which merited the Shady Grove Court’s
formalist approach to rules interpretation, based on the
proposition that there exist certain inherently “procedural”
norms195 that are distinct from those of “substantive” law that
defines legal rights and obligations, Article III-based
justiciability doctrine, of which “standing” is a more specific
category,196 is liberally informed by political considerations that
vary from case to case and judge to judge197 and “attitudes
toward the avoidance of decision on justiciability grounds are
apt to vary directly with perceptions as to the institutional role
of judicial review.”198 While “[t]he threshold requirements [for
standing] are attributed to the ‘case’ and ‘controversy’ terms
that define the federal judicial power in Article III[,]”199 the
text of Article III does not expressly refer to standing which is,
rather, a creature of judicial interpretation.
193. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State
Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure
Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167,
1169-70 (2005).
194. See generally The Fruits of Shady Grove, supra note 19.
195. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
196. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD
H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3529 (3d ed. 2008).
197. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
198. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 196, at §
3529.
199. 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 95, at § 3531.
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Justiciability doctrine’s indeterminacy200 renders it
incapable of uniform, principled application in federal court
decisions. Referring to the “malleable” nature of the precedents
that “afford ample opportunity for courts to avoid decision on
justiciability grounds simply because decision is thought to be
inconvenient,” Wright, Miller, Cooper, and Freer observe that
“[t]his opportunity has fostered a continuing debate on the
extent to which courts should in fact be free to avoid awkward
decisions on grounds of ‘prudence’ falling somewhere between
implementation of strict principle and mere caprice.”201 The
authors comment:
Over the course of the Twentieth century,
judicial opinions moved back and forth along the
intermediate spectrum from emphasis on a policy
that judicial review not be available freely to a
gradually expanding concern that judicial review
be available whenever substantial need can be
shown.202
Hollingsworth’s majority and dissenting opinions reflect
opposite ends of this spectrum. Given the “nearly ineffable”203
state of federal standing doctrine, the case for federal standing
uniformity on the issue presented in Hollingsworth is weak.
200. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“Justiciability is
itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope.”).
201. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 196, at §
3529 (“The precedents are sufficiently malleable to afford ample
opportunity for courts to avoid decision on justiciability grounds
simply because decision is thought inconvenient.”); see also
Understanding Standing (I), supra note 96 (“There already has been
much speculation, and no doubt there will be much more, about
whether some or all of the Justices might be motivated to find a lack
of justiciability in either or both cases in order to avoid a holding on
the merits — and about whether they would be wise or justified in
doing so.”).
202. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 196, at §
3529.
203. Id. at § 3529 (“Expansion of the categories of justiciable
controversies has underscored the nearly ineffable nature of the
judgments involved.”); see also Wymbs v. Republican State Exec.
Comm. of Fla., 719 F.2d 1072, 1085 n.34 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
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As previously noted, the vertical choice-of-law issue in
Hollingsworth, viewed in the light of Erie jurisprudence, is
more comparable to Gasperini than to Shady Grove. Whereas
Rule 23 goes into inordinate detail about the prerequisites for
class certification, stating very explicitly that a class action
may be “maintained” if it meets the prerequisites, Rule 59, by
contrast, says little about the grounds for granting a new trial
and nothing about the standard for judicial scrutiny of damage
awards. This left Justice Ginsburg, in her Gasperini Opinion,
with room to honor New York’s substantive interests in the
uniform application, in state and federal courts, of the State’s
more rigorous standard for scrutinizing damage awards.204 In
Hollingsworth, Article III, which is the textual source of
standing decisional law, is textually open-ended, like Rule 59,
and does not lend itself to a categorical or formalist approach to
standing issues.
Notwithstanding the comparability of competing federal
and state interests in Hollingsworth and Gasperini, two of the
Justices—Ginsburg and Breyer—who voted with the Gasperini
majority and with the dissent in Shady Grove to narrowly
interpret federal law to give effect to substantive state
interests voted with the majority in Hollingsworth to override
204. Professor Steinman has invoked Gasperini to support his
contention that Erie—not Hanna—governs the choice of law issue
where a federal rule employs generalized language:

Many aspects of federal court procedure that plaintiffs
often seek to avoid are not dictated by the text of the
Federal Rules. Rather, the Rules use generalized
language that is virtually devoid of meaningful
content. It has been the judicial gloss on those
Rules— not the Rules themselves—that has led to the
pro-defendant summary judgment standards that
have held sway since the 1986 trilogy, the demanding
pleading standard recently suggested by Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, and the federal courts' current
hostility toward class actions. There is, therefore, a
surprisingly strong argument that a federal court's
choice between state and federal law on these issues
should be treated as an unguided one. The most
recent Supreme Court decision on this issue is
Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities.
Steinman, supra note 104, at 282-83.
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California’s substantive interests. Justice Kennedy remained
true to his sensitivity to state interests in the vertical choice-oflaw context by voting with the dissent in Hollingsworth and
Shady Grove, and with the majority in Windsor in deference to
the sovereign interest of the States in regulating domestic
relations.205 The unusual alignment of liberal and conservative
Justices joining in the Court’s opinion speaks more to the
politics of the Court in avoiding a broad pronouncement about
same-sex marriage applicable to all states than it does about
being consistent with Erie jurisprudence, including Gasperini.
In weighing the balance in favor of federal interests, the
Court’s majority also seems to have minimized the harm to
California’s interest in defending its initiatives when state
officials decline to do so. Walter Dellinger’s amicus brief
described to the Court several ways “for a state to guarantee a
defense of its initiatives without conscripting federal courts to
adjudicate the grievances of private parties who have nothing
more than a generalized interest in an initiative’s
enforcement.”206 Two of these methods envisioned suit in state
court to defend an initiative, brought either by initiative
proponents against the state Attorney General “for a binding
determination that the initiative is constitutional” or by the
Attorney General herself to obtain a declaratory judgment on
the initiative’s constitutionality.207 But this state court
approach—falling short of formal agency requirements—would
still have denied the Proposition 8 proponents appellate review
by the United States Supreme Court for lack of federal
standing to appeal. A third approach suggests that the State
require the Attorney General or other state official to defend

205. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
206. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of

Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 30; see also
Lederman, supra note 168 (“As Justice Breyer noted . . . the Dellinger
brief describes several ways in which California law could be
amended to prevent [executive officials in California from thwarting
the initiative process by refusing to defend the initiative], including
by providing for an independent counsel who would be required to act
as a fiduciary of the state with the responsibility of defending
initiatives when the Attorney General declines to do so.”).
207. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 31.
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the initiative,208 but this would require action by a state official
which, by implication from the rationale of the California
Supreme Court’s holding in Perry v. Brown, is incompatible
with the purpose of the initiative process to empower the
People to act independently of state officials when state
officials refuse to act. Dellinger’s fourth approach suggested
that the State require the Attorney General “to enforce [the
initiative] and take all possible appeals [without defending the
initiative], while allowing the proponents or others to
participate as amici curiae to defend the initiative on the
merits.”209 This scenario, however, is exactly what happened in
Windsor where Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued
unsuccessfully that the absence of adverseness between the
Attorney General and the respondents should have precluded
standing by the federal government.210 The fifth, and more
promising, suggestion would have the state “create an
independent office responsible for defending initiatives in cases
in which the Attorney General declines to do so[]” subject to
“removal for cause by the Governor or Attorney General.”211
But even here, would independent counsel provide as vigorous
a defense of the initiative as its official proponents? In this
connection, Justice Kennedy’s dissent cited the California
Supreme Court’s finding that the proponents “have a unique
relationship to the voter-approved measure that makes them
especially likely to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the
measure and to be so viewed by those whose votes secured the
initiative’s enactment . . . .”212 It is noteworthy that, in the
wake of Hollingsworth, “initiative proponents [in California]
have begun writing instructions into proposed laws that would
allow them to assume the power to act on behalf of the state if

208. Id.
209. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
210. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013)

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or
appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing party who
denies the validity of the complaint.”).
211. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 32.
212. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2669-70 (2013)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002,
1024 (Cal. 2011)).
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elected officials declined to do so.”213
Even if, as a matter of vertical choice-of-law doctrine, and
for the sake of argument, federal courts should be free to
second-guess a State’s judgment on the qualifications of private
parties to represent the State’s interest, how valid are the
majority’s concerns? In part, the majority and dissenting
Justices in Hollingsworth appeared to be sparring over the
qualifications of initiative proponents who lack formal
accountability to the State to represent the State’s interests.
The Court’s Opinion expressed the majority’s concern that the
proponents would be “free to pursue a purely ideological
commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to
take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public
opinion, or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”214
A contrary view of the proponents’ qualifications was expressed
by the California Supreme Court in Perry:
The experience of California courts in reviewing
challenges to voter-approved initiative measures
over many years . . . teaches that permitting the
official proponents of an initiative to participate
as parties in postelection cases, even when public
officials are also defending the initiative
measure, often is essential to ensure that the
interests and perspective of the voters who
approved the measure are not consciously or
unconsciously subordinated to other public
interests that may be championed by elected
officials[.]215
The Court’s majority implied that the State’s interest is unitary
and self-defining, and that the requirement of a formal
appointment by the State of a party as the State’s agent is
necessary to assure that the State’s interest, and none other,
will be represented. Without such a formal agency relationship,
the Court asserted, initiative proponents, who are otherwise
213. Laura W. Brill, Op Ed – A lesson for California: Bad
initiatives make bad law, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2014.
214. Id. at 2667.
215. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1023-24 (emphasis added).
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unaccountable to the State or its People, may assert their own
generalized interests. Along these lines, Dellinger’s amicus
brief cited “serious administrability concerns . . .” that would
confront a federal court “when proponents disagree among
themselves on such matters as whether to appeal, whether to
settle the case, whether to stipulate to facts, and what
arguments should be made.”216
In defending an initiative’s validity, the question of whose
interest is being asserted by a party—whether official or
private—is a difficult one. The California Supreme Court
observed in Perry v. Brown that there is no single, self-defining
State or People’s interest:
In many instances the interests of two or more
public officials or entities may conflict and give
rise to differing official views as to the validity or
proper interpretation of a challenged state law.
In such instances, it is not uncommon for
different officials or entities to appear in a
judicial proceeding as distinct parties and to be
represented by separate counsel, each official or
entity presenting its own perspective of the state’s
interest with regard to the constitutional
challenge or proposed interpretation at issue in
the case.217
216. Brief for Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents on the Issue of Standing, supra note 33, at 30.
217. Perry, 265 P.3d at 1025-26 (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court of California’s opinion suffers from its own ambiguity
concerning the “interest” official proponents are authorized by
California law to represent. Professor Lederman comments, in this
connection:

That court made numerous references to the notion
that state law provides initiative proponents the
authority to represent ‘the people’s interest,’ which it
appeared to equate with ‘the state’s interest.’ The
court was unclear, however, about whether the
‘people’s’ interest in question is the interest of the
people in voting for the initiative, or the interest of the
people in enforcement of state law: The court toggled
back and forth between references to the need ‘to
protect the people’s right to exercise their initiative
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The third interest to be factored into the Byrd interestbalancing equation is the litigant’s interest in uniformity of
outcome.218 The Supreme Court’s refusal in Hollingsworth to
apply California law to determine the sufficiency of the
proponents’ authority to assert the State’s interest for purposes
of federal standing could, in the absence of a state statute
formally appointing proponents as agents of the State, lead to a
substantial difference in the outcome of future litigation
challenging the constitutionality of state’s initiatives. Plaintiffs
who file suit to challenge the constitutionality of state
initiatives will, going forward, likely forum shop in federal
court, where formal agency principles apply under federal
standing law, gambling on a favorable trial court judgment
that will be appellate-proof. If suit were brought in state court,
parties defending the initiative, who suffer an adverse trial
judgment, would have at least two opportunities to appeal
within the state court system, though, ultimately, not to the
U.S. Supreme Court which would apply federal standing
principles as interpreted in Hollingsworth.
V. Conclusion
Hollingsworth confronted the Supreme Court with a clash
of federal and state interests typical of the Erie issues that
closely divided the Court in Shady Grove and Gasperini.
Though the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions expressly
disagreed over the weight to be accorded each interest in our
federal system, Erie and its progeny were not explicitly
power’ and the people’s interest in ‘the initiative’s
validity.’ The latter interest appears to be the same as
the sovereign’s interest in enforcement of its laws, and
thus would be consistent with the idea of the
proponents standing in for the Attorney General to
defend the state’s own interest in preserving the
validity of its laws. The former interest, however, is
more akin to the interest of the lawmaking body in
seeing to it that its legislative handiwork is honored.
Understanding Standing (VI), supra note 58.
218. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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mentioned. Nevertheless, the conflicting choice-of-law
judgments reflected in these opinions were made in the shadow
of Erie. Whether or not the Court’s broad construction of
federal standing doctrine—nominally, to avoid harming the
federal interest in the horizontal balance of power among the
three branches of the federal government—masked a behindthe-scenes decision by the Court’s majority to avoid ruling on
the merits, the Court’s Opinion upsets the vertical balance of
power between federal and state courts that lies at the heart of
Erie jurisprudence.
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